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Faith-based Politics, Enlightened Moderation
and the Pakistani Women’s Movement
Afiya Shehrbano Zia1
Abstract
Soon after his coup in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf reassured the
Pakistani people that his was not an obscurantist religious agenda. Instead, he referred to
the Ata Turk model as his inspiration in his mission to rescue Pakistanis from corrupt
democratic governments that had dominated the 1990s. A photo release of him holding
two Pekinese dogs in his arms (commonly considered na-paak or unclean by Muslims)
and surrounded by his short-haired wife, elderly mother and artist daughter, earned him a
seal of approval from progressive upper-classes at home and the international community
at large. Unlike the previous dictator, Gen Zia ul Haq, who carried out the oppressive and
misogynist Islamisation project between 1977-88, this new-age military ruler seemed to
espouse modern, ‘secular’ and liberal credentials. Thereafter began an era that has been
dominated by several sociological changes in the country. In this article, three underlying
concepts will be explored in relation to these changes and their impact on women. These
include a critique of the romanticisation of the agency of women members belonging to
the religio-political party in government; the strategic shifts in ideological positioning
within the women’s movement; and the impact of the debate over religion and secularism
in relation to women’s political reality. This essay discusses the interplay of the
understandings and contradictions of Islamic and secular identity politics in the Pakistani
women’s movement. The methodology incorporates a reading of existing scholarship as
well as observation of feminist activism in the political context of Pakistan.
Keywords: Islamist agency, secular feminism, Pakistani women’s movement
Enlightened Moderation
As a liberal dictator, one of the things Gen. Musharraf will undoubtedly be
remembered for is the promotion of women’s causes during his nine year rule as
President of Pakistan (1999-2008). He will also be remembered for his infamous
accusation of rape survivor, Mukhtaran Mai, as a case in point that women cry ‘rape’
every time they want to gain visa/asylum to Canada 2 . Under his leadership, women
gained unprecedented rights in terms of political representation in Parliament;
appointments in the federal cabinet; appointments in the armed forces and in public
services, as well as patronage in the arts and cultural expression. Most importantly, we
saw the reform of the discriminatory Zina Ordinance 3 against which the women’s
movement4 had pitted a long-term struggle.
1

Afiya S Zia is a feminist activist based in Pakistan. She is the author of ‘Sex Crime in the Islamic Context;
Rape, Class and Gender in Pakistan’. She lectures in Sociology, works in the development sector and has
edited a series of books on women’s issues. Her current research focuses on the challenges to secular
feminism in Pakistan as the women’s movement confronts growing conservatism and Islamic militancy. In
recent years, she has worked and written on democracy, civil society and dictatorship.
2
http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2005/09/2008410112050342208.html
3
These laws were passed in 1979 as part of Gen Zia ul Haq’s Islamisation policy. The Zina Ordinance
made adultery a crime against the state punishable by death and blurred the line between rape and
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At the same time, it was during these years that women increasingly started
observing the hejab, a form of scarving or veil not widely practised in Pakistan before;
piety movements gained momentum such that women preachers now had large
followings and even set up private faith-based institutions and schools. For the first time
in Pakistan, the Islamist parties won substantive seats in Parliament. Most importantly,
we saw a split in the women’s movement after 25 years, when the right wing women’s
movement withdrew from the consensus that the discriminatory Zina Ordinance
contravened the Quranic understanding of adultery. Instead, the right wing women
reversed their long-standing support from the campaign to repeal this law. They actively
organised protests and opposed, in Parliament, the efforts of the progressives to repeal or
reform the controversial Zina laws.5
These contradictions and tensions make this period one of the most interesting
and challenging for the women’s movement. General Musharraf’s very first speech
assured the Pakistani people that his was not an obscurantist religious agenda. The
reference was obvious – a distancing from the last military dictatorship of Gen Zia ul Haq
(1977-88) whose Islamisation agenda targeted women and minorities and
institutionalised legal and social discrimination. Zia’s regime had also instilled a spirit of
militancy in the army, as well as strengthened the cause of bigoted religious politics in
the country. The liberals were relieved to not have another faith-based moral crusader in
uniform.
The Enlightened Moderation theme of Gen. Musharraf’s rule become the raison
d’etre for manoeuvring his continuation at the helm of state affairs rather than calling for
elections and reverting to total civilian governance. The reason there was no concerted
serious protest movement against this was, that liberals perceived him as a potential
bulwark against the conservative ambitions of the previous government.6 Unlike previous
leaders, there was also a broad consensus that Gen. Musharraf was personally and
materially incorruptible. The religious parties saw this as an opportunity to take
advantage of swing votes, given the absence of leadership for the two leading parties, the
liberal Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the conservative Pakistan Muslim League
(PML). They also had the very recent 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terror as
rallying points around which they focussed their campaign.

consensual intercourse. Many hundreds of women have been victimised and jailed under this law. It has
since been amended in 2006 under the Protection of Women Act.
4
In this essay, I refer to the women’s movement through a more inclusive definition which recognises
women activists across the board regardless of their ideological location on the political spectrum. In
general, the activists with a consciously feminist orientation and involved in human rights based work are
referred to (by the media, analysts, and in development literature) as ‘progressives’ and ‘liberals’ while the
more right wing women activists, usually associated with religious political parties, are perceived as
‘radical’ and ‘conservative’. Gen Musharraf and his supporters positioned his rule as a ‘moderate’ wedge
between these two ends of the political spectrum.
5
Some of these debates are recorded in ‘A Five Year Report on Performance of Women Parliamentarians
in the 12th National Assembly (2002-2007)’, Naeem Mirza and Wasim Wagha, Aurat Foundation
Publication, 2009.
6
This was the Pakistan Muslim League government under Nawaz Sharif, (1996-99).
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Democratic Opportunity for Islamists, Women and Islamist Women
Fresh elections to legitimise the military take over also provided an opportunity to
the previously unsuccessful religious political parties to gain electoral success in 2002. In
the four previous elections of 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996, these parties never gained
more than 3% of Parliamentary seats. This did not mean they did not exert influence on
mainstream politics despite their lack of electoral strength. However, the atrophying of
the main political parties, the PPP and the PML, was achieved when the leaders of both
main parties went into exile after Gen. Musharraf’s coup of 1999. This was to avoid the
backlash expected from the military government’s “accountability” process initiated soon
after the 1999 coup. In 2001, the Mutahida Majlis e Amal (MMA-United Council for
Action), was founded by the then amir7 of the Jamaat e Islami,8 Qazi Hussein Ahmed,
who invited an alliance of six religious political parties. The MMA contested the
elections called by General Musharraf to restore ‘controlled’ democracy under his
leadership.
The trajectory of Islamist politics in the country is not the central concern of this
essay. However, the political context is important when we consider the social backlash
that resulted when, for the first time an Islamist alliance party gained substantial
governmental power and was democratically instituted in Pakistan through the ballot box.
The attendant alteration in the cultural landscape under the MMA has adversely affected
Pakistan’s political stability, politicised further the role of religion and has severely
impacted women in particular.
Gen. Musharraf’s “Enlightened Moderation” project was not just dismissed as a
delayed political justification for his subversion of democratic governance in Pakistan, it
was also mocked by analysts, commentators and even in popular cultural expression.
Even the right wing political party leaders understood this afterthought, as a political
posturing by (now) President Gen. Musharraf9, which he appropriated so that he may
appear to western powers as the only liberal alternative to extremist threat after 9/11.
The right wing parties had always suspected the General as liberal in his
disposition (just like the liberals hung onto this as a positive attribute, even if he was a
military man) but they were never threatened by it. The only ones who seemed to take the
enlightened moderation proposal seriously were the diasporic revivalists 10 who
7

Religious mentor/ leader
The Jamaat e Islami was a reformist movement for Indian Muslims formed in 1941 which later went on to
become a right wing Islamic political party in Pakistan. Its mass base includes an educated middle class and
despite its ideologue for a gradual Islamisation, the party never did well in any national election. For the
2002 elections, they allied with 5 other religio-political parties to form the MMA and subsequently, formed
part of the government.
9
Prior to his election as President through a controversial referendum in April 2002, Gen. Musharraf
appointed himself as Chief Executive of Pakistan. In 2000, the Supreme Court delivered a judgement that
justified the military takeover under the ‘doctrine of necessity’ and gave Musharraf a three year period to
hold General Elections and restore democracy (Zafar Ali Shah Vs Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of
Pakistan (PLD 2000 S.C 869).
10
Those involved in excavating an Islamic cultural relevance for Muslim societies as an alternate social
order in place of post-colonial modernity. This scholarship and political mobilisation has gained
momentum in the Islamophobic environment in western countries after 9/11. With reference to the
women’s movement, some of these scholars moved from their initial criticism of Islamisation projects in
Muslim majority countries and now support women’s rights within the Islamic discourse. These scholars
define themselves as ‘Islamic Feminists’, however, not all within this movement support or call for a
8
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considered this as a purported aim of Gen. Musharraf to impose a modernist, secular and
by his own inspired claim, an “Ataturk model of modernity” onto Pakistan. As seen in the
political events that unfolded after 2002, this was a seriously miscalculated evaluation.
Women’s organisations had for years been advocating for affirmative action to
facilitate women’s political representation in political foray and this seemed like a pipedream. Even under the liberal government of the late Benazir Bhutto, women’s
representation in Parliament was at a mere 1.4% and her party pleaded lack of political
support from the Opposition to increase this quota.
However, the Legal Framework Order (2002) 11 under Gen. Musharraf made
Constitutional changes that increased the number of overall seats in the legislature and
increased the quota for reserved seats for women substantially. Apart from the (12)
directly elected women, an unprecedented 60 seats for women were reserved for the 2002
elections. Women’s organisations worked dynamically with women candidates to
campaign for these seats. The MMA won an overall 51 seats in the National Assembly of
which 12 had to be filled by its women members.
Although strongly opposed to a woman as head of an Islamic state and complicit
in preventing women from contesting for public office and even from exercising their
right to vote, the MMA women readily accepted seats that were fielded by them on behalf
of their male relatives. There is no better example of politics by proxy than this. Although
traditionally, women representatives from other political parties do not fare any better
and also tend to operate as male proxies, yet the religious political parties make no
apology for this trend. Theirs is a clear agenda – take any opportunity, including those
attributed as progressive, modernist means, only to subvert them towards conservative
ends. Thus, despite opposing the quota accorded to women on principle, the MMA
women representatives actively participated in the legislative process between 2002 and
2007. One MMA Parliamentarian is reported to have said that women should have
separate, segregated assemblies to debate their issues and that MMA would avail of the
reserved seats only to ensure repeal of this provision once they had built the political
power base that would enable them to do so.12
The record of the MMA provincial government formed in the North Western
Frontier Province (NWFP, neighbouring with Afghanistan), is a bleak trajectory that
signals the political slide into uber conservatism as exemplified in the Hisba
(Accountability) Act. This law originally proposed by the MMA in NWFP in 2003, in
violation of the Constitution, essentially attempted to legalise gender apartheid by
awarding the Mohtasib (Arbiter) the duty to protect Islamic values and etiquette and act
as vigilante. Under his watch, a culture police was to be appointed for the ‘Promotion of
Virtue and Prevention of Vice’ to monitor the social and personal relationships and
activities of citizens. It was passed by the NWFP legislative assembly on the second
attempt but on a reference by Gen. Musharraf, was disallowed by the Supreme Court as
contravention of the Constitution, in 2006.
theocratic state. At the same time, some of these revivalist academics do not support or uphold feminist
values either. In this essay, I recognise this distinction between Islamic Feminists and Revivalists with
reference to women’s issues.
11
Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 2002 indemnified Gen Musharraf’s coup and gave him an extension of
five years as President among other constitutional changes.
12
Quoted in Nazish Brohi, ‘The MMA Offensive; Three years in power 2003-2005’, Monograph by Action
Aid, Pakistan, 2006, pg. 58.
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Just like liberal and nationalist agendas are constructed across the body politic of
women, the religious right too derives its moral authority from womanhood as a signifier
of its ideological commitment to preserve male-defined, religiously ordained social order.
Thus the MMA rule in NWFP based itself on a moral imperative to provide social order
through vigilantism and remove all visible markers of womanhood from the public and
relegate it to the private realm.
During the Musharraf years (1999-2008) on the one hand, we saw women being
consciously inducted in public services, such as the first woman state bank governor,
official female guards of Jinnah’s13 mausoleum, airline pilots, as coast guards and in the
armed forces and senior positions in the bureaucracy. On the other hand, in the NWFP, a
systematic drive was launched to remove any signs of womanhood in the public sphere.
For example, women’s shelters were attacked as western inspired initiatives that
encouraged adultery and obscenity. In fact, a full fledged anti-obscenity campaign was
conducted by the youth wing of the MMA whereby billboards and hoardings of women
in advertisements were blackened with paint and torn down. The most symbolic act was
the order by the provincial government that all mannequins must be removed from shops
as they represented the (disembodied) female form in public. All forms of femaleness
must be relegated to the private, domestic realm of the family. Women leaders and
activists of the religious parties were at the forefront and complicit in such campaigns as
well as, in efforts that actively prevented women from exercising their vote in local
elections.14
These contradictions in the self-acclaimed liberal dispensation of General
Musharraf’s government peaked under his rule which had accommodated Islamist
politics for political expediency. Although this is not untrue of previous dictatorships in
Pakistan, the result this time, however, has influenced unprecedented social upheaval and
an academic conflation of notions of what is liberal, secular, modern or traditional. This
period split the liberals and conservatives alike. In principle, liberals were supporting a
military dictator who wasn’t quite dictatorial, yet he had accommodated the religiopolitical parties who instituted the most radical conservative drives in the NWFP. At the
same time, Gen. Musharraf played the buffer in resisting their attempt to impose
religiousity over state and cultural discourse.
The liberal/conservative or modernist/traditional divide worked in synch and
harmony since it did not directly challenge the interests of the liberal elite, who in turn
supported a (politically conservative) military under a liberal leader. The military in turn
was receiving moral and financial support for its frontline role in the war on terror and
thus (ostensibly) breaking from its traditional support of jihadi militants. 15 The
13

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, (1876-1948) first Governor General and the Quaid or founder of Pakistan.
Afiya Shehrbano, The Invisible Woman, The News, Karachi, April 21, 2005, http://thenews.com.pk
15
Ahmed Rashid describes jihadi militants in Afghanistan as those who wage militancy so as to impose a
new Islamic order by adopting the shariah or Islamic order not for the purpose of pursuing justice or any
social benefits but as a means to regulate personal behaviour and a regime that sustains itself through
punitive rule. Rashid describes this as a perversion of the original meaning of jihad which during Prophet
Muhammad’s time was understood as the struggle to improve the self and/or transform a corrupt society.
The Pakistani secret service, military and intelligence agencies invoke the notion of jihad as a holy war and
use this as a training ethos and have historically relied on it as a metaphor for the struggle for the liberation
of Indian-held Kashmir and against the communist occupation of Afghanistan. Ahmed Rashid, ‘Jihad; The
Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia’, Penguin 2003, England.
14
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conservative religious parties who opposed this role as America’s ally, still stayed in
government to gain credibility as a legitimate democratic entity. Through provincial
governance they actively radicalised the socio-cultural political environment by wedding
religious codes with and by, furthering cultural conservatism.
However, my interest in exploring these contradictions is not speculative. Rather,
I am interested to look through the lens of the women’s movement to assess how these
developments have reflected and impacted the strategic positions and the identity politics
within the Pakistani women’s movement itself. In other words, the inherent
contradictions within the progressive women’s movement of the 1980s onwards, with
regard to its strategic relationship with religion, is a mirror reflection of the interplay of
overall religious and secular identity politics played out from 2002 to 2008. This has left
the women’s movement more polarised on the issue of whether it is still possible to
reclaim the potential of religion to lobby for women’s rights in the Muslim context or, if
the only choice is now to remain wary of the religious idiom and stick to secular
credentials and base its demands on a universal human rights discourse.16
Faith-based Feminisms
The first generation of Islamic modernist feminists17 believed in the participatory
nature of religion, as well as the ‘psychological healing’ and the ‘solace and solidarity’18
it may provide in the absence of alternatives, particularly for women from lower classes.
This attribution of women’s religious expressions as a placation or compensation for their
social class is also not new. Linked to the critique of the urban-based, bourgeois
women’s movement has been the suggestion that one reason for the failure of mass
mobilisation of women across classes, was because they chose to posit their politics
outside of the religious framework.
Contemporary new scholarship challenges this limited attribution. Revivalist
literature by academics studying contemporary Islamic movements, advocate the viability
of re-instituting alternative Islamic economic, legal and political systems. They do not
consider such projects to be simply reactions to Western colonialism and imperialism.
With regard to the study of women activists of such Islamic political movements in
Pakistan, this literature challenges the notion that right wing women are pressurised to
join Islamic political parties. It also challenges the idea that Islam/an Islamic state is

16
The emergence of all these identity conflicts cannot be read in an historical vacuum. Many of the sociopolitical crises came to a head during this period but were in continuation of growing violence and
conservatism that pre-date 9/11. The contention here is that during the Musharraf regime, the conservative
elements and faith based religious parties sought to expand their brand with renewed zeal in the wake of
9/11 and in an effort to reclaim and articulate all symbols and policies based purely on an imagined Islamic
identity.
17
Feminists concerned with empowerment of their gender within a ‘rethought Islam’ and are involved in
reinterpreting and re-examining a masculinist reading of the Quran (divine Holy Book of Muslims) and
Shariah (Islamic law derived from the Quran and compiled sayings of the Prophet of Islam, Prophet
Muhammad. Riffat Hasan and Asma Barlas are well-known academics residing in the USA who fall in this
category. In Pakistan, Islamic feminist scholarship is most often associated with Farida Shaheed heading
the NGO, Shirkat Gah and is a south asian contact for the Women Living Under Muslim Laws network.
18
Farida Shaheed, “Women’s Experiences of Identity, Religion and Activism in Pakistan”’ in ‘The PostColonial State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan’, S.M.Naseem and Khalid Nadvi (Eds),
Oxford University Press, 2002, pg 367.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #1 November 2009

https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol11/iss1/15

230

6

Zia: Faith-based Politics, Enlightened Moderation

oppressive for women as defined by orientalist literature or that women’s resistance,
agency and autonomy must be the opposite of subordination.19
The Islamic feminists of the 1980s in Pakistan wished to sieve out the patriarchy
from a male-defined Islam and saw religion as a pawn abused by an oppressive state.
Their project became to reclaim feminist possibilities within a reformed Islam and they
were well supported by sympathetic international donors for such efforts. However, this
strategy, despite some acclaim by Iranian Islamic feminists, has been criticised for paying
a price whereby the feminism part of Islamic feminism gets subsumed and relegated as a
lesser appendage to the more compelling and overarching Islamic phenomena. Islam as a
political strategy is increasingly becoming a limited empowering tool for the Islamic
feminist reformist project – instead it has become a legitimate mobilising strategy almost
exclusively for the radical right.20
The Islamic feminists clearly discredited the patriarchal Islamist project that
aimed to inscribe religion onto the state and convert it from a secular entity into a sacred
one.21 The more recent scholarship from revivalists argues exactly the same but opposes
the end analysis. Humeira Iqtidar suggests that yes, Islamists wish to inscribe religion
onto the state but by virtue of this imposition, will be converting the sacred (agenda of
religiousity) into a secular entity (state politics), rather than the other way around.22 She
upholds that since all secular states are essentially premised on religious faith, why can
Islamic politics not be an equal contender for the secular label? What she doesn’t specify
is a repeated question asked by Pakistani secularists – what kind of a state does this
project envision? What laws, economy and processes will it be governed by and what
would the citizenship of women and minorities be based upon? In other words, what is
the political or indeed, economic relevance of this proposition?
Meanwhile, various western governments propelled by their own political
compulsions, seek to fund such introspection, research and development by looking for
alternative expressions of a ‘soft’ Islam in Muslim countries. This is pandering to and
resulting in apologia literature and diluted political insight into the dynamics of
fundamentalist strategies. Worst of all, it is premised on essentialist notions that in

19

With reference to women and Pakistan this literature includes my readings of Humeira Iqtidar, The
Changing Role of ‘Muslim Fundamentalists’, Doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge, UK, 2008,
Faiza Mushtaq, ‘Al-Huda: New Forms of Islamic Education’ (paper presented at the ‘Miskeen’ study group
in Karachi). Others would include Sadaf Aziz, ‘Beyond Petition and Redress: Mixed Legality and Consent
in Marriage for Women in Pakistan’ and Moeen Cheema and Abdul Rahman, ‘From Hudood Ordinances to
the Women’s Protection Act, papers presented at the 3rd Social Sciences Annual Conference at the Lahore
University of Management Sciences, December 2007, which look to tackle the woman question from a new
perspective located entirely within Islamic jurisprudence. Amina Jamal’s work and doctoral thesis,
similarly, explores the potential of a ‘balanced modernity’ amongst right wing women activists inspired by
modern Islamic revivalism (see bibliography for a list of her work).
20
For detailed critique on Islamic feminism in Pakistan, see Afiya S Zia, ‘The Reinvention of Feminism in
Pakistan’, Feminist Review, Issue 91, South Asian Feminisms; Negotiating New Terrains, Editors, Firdous
Azim, Nivedita Menon and Dina M Siddiqi, Palgrave Macmillan, London, UK, 2009.
21
Farida Shaheed, Gender, Religion and the Quest for Justice in Pakistan, Report for United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) & Heinrich Boll Stiftung project on Religion,
Politics and Gender Equality, Geneva, 2009, pg 37.
22
Humeira Iqtidar, The Changing Role of ‘Muslim Fundamentalists’, Doctoral dissertation, University of
Cambridge, UK, 2008, pg 163.
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Muslim majority countries, it is the religious identities that are foremost considerations
when analysing socio-political behaviour.
The Islamic Revivalist movement globally is usually dated to the 1970s and refers
to a resurgent ethos, sensibility and even academic interest in Islam in contemporary
Muslim societies. Such a movement includes the women’s mosque or piety movements
which often began informally and sometimes were linked to social welfare and only later
became more organised and structured. Some contemporary revivalist Pakistani
scholars23 quote revivalist literature stating that since there is no formal church or clergy
in Islam, thereby there is no possibility of calling for a separation of state and religion, or
for secularisation. The suggestion is that Islam is, by this definition, already secular.
However, to the extent that there is de facto state power held by many a clergy in
Muslim-majority states, or who hold the state hostage through competing religious
idioms, this automatic secular theory is a myth.
In any case, the larger point is that dismantling the structures of political Islam
will not challenge the increasing privatisation of religion in Pakistan.24 This private realm
is the point of entry for faith-based activism and intervention and the point where
Islamists are most successful. This private realm has become the site where both Islamic
feminists and revivalists base their analysis and hope for potentially liberating faith based
politics, particularly for women. Their differences come about in the understanding of
politics.
While Islamic feminists consider religion a private spiritual, cultural and social
vehicle of empowerment, the revivalists invite the political expression of belief as a
legitimate mode of women’s agency and liberation. They also differ on the nature and
role of the state but revivalist women, beyond their rejection of western universalism,
secular laws and modernity as a colonial imposition, have not outlined their vision as
clearly. Some works-in-progress advocate the need for Islamic jurisprudence and
authentic structures such as Qazi courts to replace the post-colonial judicial systems in
Islamic republics such as Pakistan.25 However, these are already the demands of some
Islamist parties and even the Taliban, in Pakistan. Thus such demands from these
scholars and academics (mostly western educated themselves) overlap within the realm
of conservative politics. Also, such demands are deeply contested amongst Islamic
scholars, including those within Pakistan.
Having said that, since Islamic feminists in Pakistan are clear about their demand
for a secular or non-theocratic state, their demand for the repeal of Islamic laws and
separation of religion from state business is a consistent one. By this token they can also
continue to simultaneously work on feminising women’s relationship with religion within
the private or social sector. However, revivalists challenge this demarcation by
illustrating the lived realities of women involved in piety and faith-based movements and
23

See note 18
By privatisation of religion I do not imply that religious expression has therefore dissipated from the
public. Instead, social conservatism has increased precisely because personal expressions of religion are
influencing public articulations to the exclusion of other forms of sociability. This includes language, dress,
and a general conflation of Islam with everything that is to do with ‘Arab-ized’ culture as a conscious effort
to counter south asian (Indian) influences.
25
Discussion at a seminar, The 3rd Social Sciences Annual Conference at the Lahore University of
Management Sciences, December 2007, Lahore, Pakistan. Qazi courts would be presided by Islamist
jurists or ‘qazis’. Currently, Pakistan’s judiciary runs on a secular model inherited from colonial India.
24
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insist this should be seen as political and a valid instrument of empowerment,
mobilisation and expression of women’s attempts to cross the private/public divide.
It is important to point out the lack of debate and discussion within or indeed,
between the various factions of the women’s movement in Pakistan. Even the upper-class,
urban- based, academic feminists tend to dismiss challenges, critiques or even dialogue
with dissenters or conservative elements, as a waste of time because there are so many
‘real issues’ or (usually, donor funded) projects to get on with. This paper does not
suggest that the shift in ideologies within the women’s movements in Pakistan have come
about through any conscious debate or consensus. Rather, this paper argues that
competing theories on the role of religion in relation to women are shifting due to
academic interests on the subject rather than out of a political engagement. The central
argument in this paper challenges the temptation within this scholarship to promote the
practices and activism of the right-wing women as indicative of a newly founded
liberationist alternative to western feminism and universal rights.
Contesting for Primacy in the Private Realm
On one level, Pakistani feminists have been concerned with disentangling the
state policy of Gen. Zia that attempted to limit women to the chador and chaardevari26
which relegated women’s primary roles as domestic. At the same time, some feminists
equally recognise, emphasise and value the private spaces and sanctuaries that women
have created to fulfill their spiritual needs. This has meant that practices such as dars27
and khatams28 are assessed as empowering strategies in an environment where they lack
democratic or domestic relevance.
Hence, today the challenge is not simply from an overtly theocratic state that is
pushing an Islamist agenda but fragmented, organised faith-based (almost always gendersegregated) interest groups. They compete for legitimacy in routine politics and for
relevance in the social fabric of the country. This growing piety movement includes many
women religious leaders and home-based preachers, several of whom have successfully
activated networks and mobilised communities to spread their word. Often, though not
always, the women’s theology groups are purported for the cause of women’s rights in
Islam. What used to be the strategies and vocabulary of the liberal and upper class nongovernmental organisations’ (NGO) women activists, have been claimed by these
supposedly more ‘indigenous’ Islamic women’s rights activists.29 These Islamist women
may not be overtly politicised as yet but certainly are involved in (what is commonly
known in NGO vocabulary as) ‘advocacy’ towards this end.
Amina Jamal’s (2005) work on Jamaat e Islami30 (JI) women’s political activism
argues that the secular women’s movement in Pakistan has refused to recognise the
Jamaat women’s agency and only see this in terms of a passive submission to Jamaat men.
Jamal warns of the danger of denying the autonomy and emancipatory self-definition of
Jamaat women. Jamal suggests this denial allows some (secular) feminists to re-present
26

Literally, the veil and the four walls of the home – ie, the private, domestic realm was appropriate for
women.
27
Piety movements, or informal study groups on Quran and discussions on Islam.
28
Literally ‘the end’ prayers usually held at funerals followed by sermons.
29
Amina Jamal, ‘Feminist ‘selves’ and feminism’s ‘others’; feminist representations of Jamaat-e-Islami
women in Pakistan, Feminist Review, Issue 81, 2005, pg 19, www.feminist-review.com
30
See note 7.
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the right wing women as victims of false consciousness so that they may construct their
own identities as feminists with a modernist agenda, particularly against Islamisation.31
In contrast, Jamal’s own work attempts to highlight the effectiveness of Jamaat women’s
autonomous attempts to appropriate modernity towards their own ends and their
understanding of rights. These modern social and political rights, according to the Jamaat
women that Jamal interviews, should enhance, not repress Islamic values. She quotes
from an interview of a woman activist of the Jamaat e Islami (JI) who explains that while
Jamaat women are modern, they are not westernised.32
Similarly, Humeira Iqtidar’s (2008) work on women in the Jamaat e Islami (JI)
and Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD),33 also questions the notion that women are pressurised or
coerced to conform to piety movements or join Islamist parties. 34 Her theoretical
perspective relies on scholarship that challenges the modernisation framework and which
looks to include religion as a legitimate category of political analysis. She argues that the
religious agency and belief of women activists of right wing political parties in Pakistan,
is not blind but rather, is historically and culturally grounded and therefore, substantive.
Iqtidar (2008) goes further than Jamal on two points which argue that women’s
agency can be mediated by religious belief and does not have to be consciously feminist.
Her research finds that resistance to male domination may be incidental rather than
purposeful in the activism of these right wing women. Secondly, her analysis of these
religious political parties suggests that by rejecting or failing at secular careers, women
who join these Islamist parties find independent avenues which afford these women,
liberation. She also quotes scholarship that suggests that the status of women in postrevolutionary Iran or indeed, under any Islamised regimes may have carried “certain
advantages” and in any case, should not be analysed through any “de-contextualized
categories”.35 Further, Iqtidar contends that by bringing religious belief into the public
sphere and recognising it as a motivating factor, this trend is secularising Muslim
societies.36
Where Jamal (2005) and Iqtidar (2008) stop short in their attribution of agency to
women activists of Islamist parties, is when they do not acknowledge the purpose of the
agency and the conservative ends towards which it is used. The few examples that Jamal
does quote in terms of Jamaat women emulating secular feminist strategies and
methodology of politicking, may be countered by the many instances where they also
support anti-women legislation and policies.
Both scholars rely on Saba Mahmood’s challenge to feminist theory which
assumes that agency must be substantive and informed by a feminist consciousness.37
Instead, Mahmood argues that in fact, piety movements prove that agency can be
attributed even to passive, docile non-action and preservation of the status quo and that
feminist politics is not a natural desire. Humeira Iqtidar concludes through her dialogue
31

Jamal, 2005, pg 17.
Ibid, pg 20.
33
Humeira Iqtidar, The Changing Role of ‘Muslim Fundamentalists’, Doctoral dissertation, University of
Cambridge, UK, 2008
34
Iqtidar, above cited, pg 166.
35
Ibid, pg 170.
36
Ibid, pg 163.
37
Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety; The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton University
Press, 2005.
32
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with a woman member of Jamaat ud Dawa, that Islamist parties can be oppressive for
some but liberating sanctuaries for others. 38 The political experience in the Pakistani
context, however, has shown that faith based agency of women in religious parties is not
just often used for non-feminist ends but increasingly to actively support a patriarchal
Islamic agenda.
Three different examples help to put this contention into context.39 The first is an
observation on the role and performance of right wing women representatives and the
political positions they took on women’s issues in Parliament between 2002 and 2008.
Apart from the overall conservative and anti-women legislation and policies promoted in
the NWFP discussed above, within the national Parliament too there were clear
ideological divides on legislation regarding women’s rights. When the opposition party,
the PPP, proposed a bill on domestic violence, it was resisted by several male members
from the ruling party (PML-Q) as well as the religious party, MMA. This led to a heated
debate and women Parliamentarians staged a protest in the Assembly when the (male)
Parliamentary secretary opposed the bill on the grounds that a Muslim husband had the
right to admonish and even beat his wife if she was disobedient.
In an impressive move of going against the party line, Samia R. Qazi, member of
Parliament representing the religious party, the MMA (daughter of the amir of the JI,
Qazi Hussein Ahmed), defended the domestic violence bill by taking a stand against the
Parliamentary secretary’s interpretation of the Quranic verse. Admittedly, Samia Qazi’s
intervention was in support of protecting women from gratuitous marital violence as
interpreted by male readings of religious verses. At the same time, her intervention record
shows that she supported the larger understanding that a woman of a ‘certain character’
and attitude may warrant light beatings but this should not become an excuse for men to
use wives as punching bags.40 Such stances can be read as proof of agency of Islamist
women but not only is this merely non-feminist but indeed, actively upholds a patriarchal
coercive social order or contract with reference to ‘appropriate’ matrimonial obedience or
conduct.
The second exemplar with regard to Islamist women’s agency is in connection
with the Jamia Hafsa incident in 2007 which was simply a precursor of the potential of
the personal religious agency of women being converted in to political activism. The
Jamia Hafsa women students belonged to a religious school or madrassa part of the Lal
Masjid mosque in the capital city of Islamabad. They illegally occupied the premises
adjoining the mosque land in protest against the government’s threat to demolish and
reclaim it as a suspected hotbed for terrorist indoctrination. The Jamia Hafsa women
students conducted a vigilante puritanical drive against ‘unislamic’ practices, such as the
sale of music and by demanding that video shops shut down. They also kidnapped a
woman from the neighbourhood suspected of running a prostitution business and only let
38

Iqtidar, cited above, pg. 174.
Although there are plenty of cases where the women members of religious parties such as the JI/MMA
have taken outright anti-women stands, the examples quoted here are deliberately chosen to acknowledge
the agency of these women as claimed by the revivalist scholars. However, the point here is to highlight
that even when this agency is seemingly neutral, it in fact supports and bolsters a patriarchal,
discriminatory social, political and economic order.
40
‘A Five Year Report on Performance of Women Parliamentarians in the 12th National Assembly (20022007)’, Naeem Mirza and Wasim Wagha, Aurat Foundation Publication, Pakistan, pg. 142-150.
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her go once she ‘repented’. Eventually, a few months later, the seminary was stormed by
state troops which led to the death of many in the mosque and while the government
denies any women students were killed in the shoot-out, there has been no transparent
inquiry or report on the action.
Women’s rights and human rights groups in Pakistan protested against the
vigilantism of the Jamia Hafsa women students. At the same time, they also disputed the
need for such disproportionate use of state force when troops launched a military
operation (Operation Silence, 10th July, 2006) against the mosque where the clerics and
students were lodged, armed and refused to vacate the state property. The visuals of these
women students (which are also available on Youtube) show hundreds of women
completely clad in black veils and holding bamboo sticks. However, other Islamist parties,
including their women activists, have remained silent on this issue. They do not publicly
support nor condemn such action nor do they express solidarity with the women of Jamia
Hafsa as a political statement. The only exception was the Jamaat e Islami women’s wing
which held a press conference in July 2008, one year after the incident and after losing
the national elections in February 2008. Former MNA (Member of National
Assembly/Parliament) and representative of the JI, Saima Qazi, accused the former
government (which included her!) as desecrating “Islamic principles such as burqa, veil
and beard” 41 with reference to the Jamia Hafsa incident. She also demanded that an
Inquiry on the incident should be held but made no comment as to the actions of the JH
women themselves or to their politics or action.
A third example of the kind of agency demonstrated by women in relation to
gendered religious identities is more complex. After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in
Nov. 2008, the pressure on the Pakistani government led to a crackdown for hunting
suspects believed to be members of Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD). This organisation is
considered to be a front or cover for the banned extremist religious group, Lashkar e
Tayabba (LeT). In defence of the Jamaat ud Dawa, some 200 Hindu minority women in
Sindh came out to protest against this state action in support of this banned terrorist
organisation.42 They claimed that JuD supported their poor community and gave them
protection and services. Importantly, these women crossed gender and religious
boundaries to support those who would ordinarily be their religious antagonists. I submit,
the progressive Women’s Action Forum43 has difficulty mobilising 200 Muslim women
to protest on cases of rape or violence, leave alone reaching to minority communities to
support their causes. This, despite the fact, that many non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) have been involved in service delivery and developing relationships with the
communities for some 30 years now.
The contention is then, that religious affiliation and empowerment from within the
religious discourse may be completely independent of delivering or receiving human
rights and development (quite different from philanthropy). Thus, the system of
patronage as used by religious organisations extends itself out to minority communities
41

‘JI for commission to probe Jamia Hafsa tragedy’, Thursday 28th July 2008, The News International,
http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=123312
42 ‘Pak Hindus rally to support Jamaat ud Dawa’, Dawn, December 16th, 2008,
www.dawn.com/2008/12/17/nat4.htm
43
Women’s Action Forum (WAF) is an urban based forum and pressure group that was formed in 1981 to
struggle against the imposition of discriminatory Islamic laws. It has chapters in four main cities in the
country and is a non-funded, non-hierarchical organisation.
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(too) while simultaneously making them targets of legal and social discrimination as part
of their religious ethos. Either way, the hegemonistic intent of these faith-based
organisations, which are often linked to religious political parties, is clearly political
rather than merely charitable. Both ways, such a strategy can work its faith based politics
or agency, to liberate and oppress at the same time.44 This is true for women and minority
concerns alike.
Cultural Authenticity
The central anguish of the revivalists, particularly in the Islamophobic
environments of western countries in the post 9/11 era, is over how Muslim countries
have adopted wholesale modernist agendas of western governments and ideologies of
western feminisms. This is not a new accusation, since conservatives and Islamists
including Gen. Zia ul Haq himself, repeatedly attempted to de-legitimise women activists
who challenged the state for equal rights, as being ‘westernised’. Yet, 30 years later when
the feminists of the second wave45 have not only entrenched their politics and gathered
support at grassroots levels, it’s a misplaced indictment that is rarely officially issued
from Islamists in Pakistan, as it is from diasporic contexts.46 Islamophobia has becomes
pivotal in the consciences of diasporic Muslims, it seems, when analysing secular
resistance in Muslim countries. Diasporic analysis also tends to fetishize and romanticise
Islamist movements, particularly its women activists.
The contradiction in placing premium on the “authentic believing” Muslim
woman as opposed to the westernised secular Muslim woman is clear in two perspectives
on this issue. On the one hand, Amina Jamal’s analysis attempts to highlight that in fact,
the values, goals and efforts of Jamaat e Islami women are located in a modernist
discourse and not some traditionalist one.47 On the other hand, Humeira Iqtidar’s work
suggests that modernity is a construct that must be rejected and she suggests that by
redefining agency and liberation, we can accept that these can be defined in religious
terms, as well as non-feminist, respectively. 48 According to both views, whether we
44

This is different from Humeira Iqtidar’s suggestion that it is only a matter of ‘perception’ that Islamist
parties may be oppressive for some because others may feel liberated by joining them. The point here is
that the agenda of such an ideology is to allow liberation only if the ‘freed agent’ accepts an overall
discriminatory or unequal framework. Quite different from the criticism that willing members are victims
of ‘false consciousness’, my point is that these members do accept the limited and unequal status of women
and minorities by consciously justifying and rationalising them within the modernist discourse.
45
The second wave of the women’s movement in the 1980s and 1990s pivoted around a dynamic and
sustained struggle against the military dictatorship of Gen Zia ul Haq (1977-88) who made women direct
targets of a misogynist state under his purported Islamisation project. The women’s movement is
acknowledged as perhaps the strongest challenger of this very politically and socially oppressive historical
period.
46
Observation by renowned human rights activist and lawyer, Asma Jahangir, who is often at the receiving
end of criticism and threats for exposing human rights abuses, both those committed in the name of religion
as well as by the state. She notes the wave of such accusations against her personally and against women
activists who identify with a liberal politics within Pakistan, has reduced considerably; private conversation,
March 2009, Lahore.
47
Amina Jamal, Gendered Islam and modernity in the nation-spaces; women’s modernism in the Jamaat-eIslami of Pakistan, Feminist Review, Issue 91, 2009, Palgrave Macmillan, London, UK, www.feministreview.com.
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Humeira Iqtidar, ‘The Changing Role of Muslim Fundamentalists’, Doctoral dissertation, University of
Cambridge, UK, 2008, pg 187.
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accept or reject modernity as defined by the secularists’ worldview, this allows an
acknowledgement of Islamist women’s agency as historically more relevant and
culturally grounded.
However, both sets of analyses belong to what I term, political nunneries.49 These
are ethnographies that attribute agency as part of an anthropological effort to (re)
construct an ideological framework for a political alternative to liberal notions of secular
modernity. In the process, they stop short of contextualizing the political articulations of
the agency that they recognise or ascribe to Islamist women that they study. In other
words, when this agency converts into political articulation, there is no discussion of the
implications, outcome or effects of such agency which has been, in the experience of
Pakistan, both vociferously anti-women at worst, or silent and hence complicit, at best.
Religious political parties claim to be true protectors of women as long as women
adhere to their domestic domain, since the family is considered to be the locus of
women’s security. In a monograph that records the actions and stances of the MMA
between 2003 and 2005, Brohi lists a series of cases of violence against women in the
NWFP during the leadership of the MMA government.50 She notes the repeated silence
on these cases including violent rapes, forced marriages and honour killings against
which MMA claims to be vehemently opposed. Even beyond the NWFP, on the
publicised case of the jirga51 ordered rape of Mukhtara Mai, which was condemned by
activists across the ideological divide, women members of the MMA, at a seminar in
Lahore, demanded a ban on NGOs whom they held responsible for “harming the country
by raising the Mukhtara Mai issue”.52 Brohi notes, “The MMA’s strategy for preventing
violence against women such as rape, gang rape and harassment is to reduce to minimum
if not eliminate, their interaction with men”.53
Against this backdrop then, it is difficult to understand how these religious
political parties can be understood to be potential reformists and ideologically liberating
spaces, rather than politically radical and indeed, conservative to the point of being
fascistic, as in the above examples.
Some Proposals of Reconciliation
The temptation to conflate cultural purity with Islam as found in the new
revivalist scholarship poses a practical challenge for the women’s movement in Pakistan.
The approach of such a self-acclaimed “reconstructive project”54 suggests that “[Since]
customary practice is very often the locus of offending norms, particularly in the area of

49 Afiya S. Zia, ‘Challenges to secular feminism in Pakistan: a critique of Islamic feminism and
revivalism’, Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge, UK, Occasional Paper No 29, ISNN:
1476-7511, pg 14.
50
Nazish Brohi, The MMA Offensive; Three years in power 2003-2005, Monograph by Action Aid,
Pakistan, 2006, pg 62-66.
51
Tribal assembly of male elders which resolves disputes through consensus. Jirgas are outlawed by the
state but function effectively as a parallel legal system in tribal and rural areas and increasingly in urban
pockets of Pakistan.
52
State of Human Rights in 2005, Annual Report by Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore,
Pakistan, published by Maktaba Jadeed Press, 2006.
53
Brohi, 2006, pg 67.
54
Sadaf Aziz, ‘Beyond Petition and Redress: Mixed Legality and Consent in Marriage for Women in
Pakistan’, 2005, in Bayan, Published by Simorgh, Lahore, Pakistan, pg 60.
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forced marriages in Pakistan, the implantation of Islamic legality in this sphere is a
greater bulwark against such practices in that an alternate social order is proposed….”55
This project overlaps with the Islamic feminist one that attempts to separate
patriarchal cultural practices from ‘pure’ religion. It is also the locale where secular
feminists have struggled the most in their realisation that women’s sexuality is the site
where both culture and religion collude to control and measure society’s moral order.
Thus the latter’s concern is not so much on the interpretation of the law but over the fact
that patriarchal culture and/or religion will dominate any translation of the social order.
These feminists are not looking for bulwarks, rather they are looking to uproot and
transform gender relations to ensure that women’s choices are neither divinely legally
ordained nor sanctioned by a patriarchal culture.
Conventional Islamic punishment, such as stoning to death which is practised in
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, is not executed in Pakistan. Yet the informal, parallel
legal structures institutionalise extra judicial practices based on the notion of retributive
justice as culturally authentic and Islamically sanctioned. If the state continues to embed
religious legality so as to reclaim and excavate an imagined ‘pure’ Islamic culture, then
necessarily some historical moments within patriarchal culture and religion will overlap
and logically, will condone stoning and honour killings.
When a woman minister for social welfare, Zille Huma, was shot at a public event
by an ‘extremist’ for not adequately veiling herself in 2007, does that fall under cultural
norms or religious sanction? Flogging is widely understood as a prescribed religious
punishment subject to circumstances, judicial process and interpretation. In cases of
adultery, blasphemy, wilful marriages and denying women their property rights by
marrying them off to the holy book, cultural sanctions are often derived from or collude
with existing religious laws. Thus until the law was amended in 2006, the Zina law
became a tool of controlling women’s choice in marriage and her mobility, not so much
about adultery. Even after the amendment, the basic premise of this law centres on the
monitoring of women’s sexuality as a threat to social order. Blasphemy, if proven, is
punishable by death but often, enraged Muslims take this law into their hands and use it
as a moral justification to attack and even kill (usually) other Muslims. In most cases, the
issue has nothing to do with blaspheming but is used to settle personal scores. Women’s
marital choice is subject to permission from her wali or guardian. At best, some women
legislators have attempted to make the state the wali rather than a woman’s male relative,
which has been resisted by the right wing women representatives. In either case, the
concept of a wali for women and minors remains a discriminatory requirement. The
cultural practice of marrying a woman to the holy book (Quran) to deny her property
rights was amended in 2005 under the Blasphemy law, as this crime is interpreted as an
insult to the holy book not as a contravention of a woman’s basic right. Retributive
justice, as meted out in cases of murder under the Qisas and Diyat56 law, sustain cultural
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Ibid, pg 67.
Those sections of the Pakistan Penal Code which relate to offences of murder and manslaughter were
replaced in 1990 by the Qisas and Diyat Ordinace which redefines the offence and its punishment in
Islamic terms. Qisas is equal punishment for the crime committed and diyat is compensation payable to the
victims or their legal heirs.
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norms of bartering compensation in return for a life taken, such as in (illegal) cultural
practices like honour killings.57
Thus, some patriarchal cultural practices do not contravene the broader Islamic
moral and social order, including attributing women lesser inheritance or minorities lesser
status as citizens. The notion that since women are guaranteed (lesser) inheritance rights
in Islam, so at least these cannot be (theoretically) resisted or denied due to any
competing cultural practices, is a defeatist one. If one is to only obtain theoretical rights,
then they may as well be equal, as prescribed by universal civil code not religious
prescription. Religion is not a logic that is going to be accepted as a piece of legislation
particularly if it challenges patriarchal norms. This piecemeal logic is also applied in
other cases where ‘progressive’ interpretations of religion are appreciated as successful
implantations of Islamic ethos. These always stop short of being equal for women with
the understanding that if such an attempt would be made, such laws would be
unsuccessful since they do not accommodate the expectations of normative religion nor
the cultural environment as determined by patriarchy.
However, such arguments are more problematic when cultural practice and
religious ethos do contravene each other. Then which will supersede, cultural authenticity
or Islam? It is very much like the question: Which came before, the chicken or the egg?
The argument that there is significant debate within Islamic tradition and ijtehad
(independent reasoning) and ijma (consensus) is the derivative method of legislating a
religious law, is simply an attempt to justify another way of bringing (western) rationality
and commonsense into the religious discourse. Gen. Musharraf’s liberal intervention
which led him to issue a reference against the proposed Hisbah Bill of the religious right
government in NWFP, allowed the Supreme Court to strike down the bill. That is how
the Council of Islamic Ideology operates and courts in Pakistan too. By and large, they
tend to respond to the political mood and leadership of the period.
Every time the Council makes a humanistic, progressive or modernist
interpretation (which coincides with the universalist human rights discourse) of an
Islamic law, this is hailed as proof of the progressive spirit of Islam. In other words, the
standard against which progress is measured in Muslim countries is often when women’s
Islamic rights are compared favourably against western or universal codes. Therefore,
despite prescribed lesser status with regard to property, polygamy, law on adultery, child
custody, evidence, blood money and so on, these Quranic prescriptions are always
justified as requiring ‘progressive’ interpretation or rendered inapplicable if ‘taken out of
context’ and thereby needing historical textual supporting evidence. This process is
reductive rather than cumulative.
To presume that interpretations can be made in vacuum under some suspended
historical period and under the pretence that, we are no longer defined by modernist
discourse, is an unrealistic political expectation. Activism demands strategic alliances, as
well as political positioning. When the opportunity came up to reform the Zina Ordinance
in 2006 during Gen. Musharraf’s government, women activists were not about to get
57

Crimes of honour are understood to flag a type of violence against women in its various manifestations
from assault, confinement, and murder characterised by motivation rather than by perpetrator. Most often,
women are victims of such crimes and are punished for violating or ‘shaming’ a male relative’s ‘honour’ by
exercising their agency through choice of marriage or perceived to transgress moral boundaries of gender
relations as defined by male cultural norms.
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caught up in a debate that had been circulating for 27 years. Eventually, the adultery laws
were not repealed as the liberal women’s movement had demanded but amended instead.
The right wing women, who clearly stood against the original Zina Ordinance from the
1980s, formally opposed the call for repeal or amending the law for the first time in 25
years. They had shifted from their earlier academic position that the law was interpreted
incorrectly. They had also rejected the political imperative behind such a law passed by
Gen. Zia ul Haq. Some 25 years later, the right wing women shifted their strategic
position on the law and followed the male dictate which insisted that any change in this
law would convert Pakistan into a “free sex zone”.58This was an absolute rejection of
modernising a discriminatory law which targeted women and which compounded rape
with adultery. This can be taken as evidence of the success of the agency of right wing
women which is non-feminist, non-modernist but of course, is clearly not just political
but very radical.
Certainly agency is not the monopoly of the vanguard and is arguably, even better
organised and used by the rearguard too. However, there is a critical blindness within
these analyses which disregard how this agency is converted into political articulation
and its impact. The suggestion that this agency helps women in their personal politics is
fine and coincides with the Islamic feminists’ stance but this cannot stop here. When this
agency spills into an organised, anti-women, anti-minorities political agenda, then the
responsibility for the consequences of the exercise of such agency must also be equally
appreciated.
The pragmatic proposal of a coalition of Islamic, secular and other feminisms in
the form of ‘hybrid feminisms’ 59 as submitted by Huma Ahmed-Ghosh is less
problematic in theory but strategically has proven to be unwise in the Pakistani
experience. The concept of ‘patriarchy trading’ which allows women some agency by
accepting patriarchy is a dormant and tentative precipice to put women on. Repeatedly,
the experience of feminist alliances has shown that right wing politics manages to
subsume and co-opt not just the tactics, vocabulary and strategies of feminism but even
manages to subvert these for the most patriarchal ends. At first, Islamic feminists rethought the concept of the veil as more polysemic than the oriental and western feminist
understanding of it. Now there is rethinking of polygamy, which is increasingly
becoming a bargain that some (first wives) negotiate in order to gain domestic relief
when second wives take over their duties. Certainly there are debates and contestations
within the religious political discourse, particularly between male and female ideologues
on the issue and place of women’s rights. However, such competitive struggles also tend
to pit the perceived ‘good Muslim woman’ who adheres to the more literal, conservative
visions of the party against the challenging ‘bad Muslim woman’. The hierarchies of
these religious parties are severe and women cannot head them nor integrate into the
mainstream decision-making process. Thus their intellectual agency is unlikely to
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contribute towards party policy unless they challenge the structures and roles for women
members internally.
If rights are not informed or premised on the basis of universal rights, then these
will be dependent on the limiting reformist agenda of patriarchal impulses within culture
and Islam, as described above. If we start accepting non-feminist agendas and lack of
active resistance to male domination as acceptable agency by women activists of
religious parties, then what hope is there of even challenging the patriarchal elements
within religious discourse? This position of the revivalists defeats the activism of both
Islamic and secular feminists alike.
It is not just a political aversion that impedes liberal and Islamist women from
coming together on women’s issues. Rather, the discourse of women’s rights has become
a competitive one, whereby most contestants on the ideological spectrum attempt to
appropriate the woman question as the marker or sign-post of their claim to political
relevance. At least, the feminist agenda has been successful in making women’s rights
central to the debate but whether this is helping the realisation or furtherance of their
rights is questionable.
When questioned on how the Zina laws should be amended, revivalist faculty
members at the prestigious Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in
Pakistan insisted that all reformative debate must be posited within Islamic history, texts
and cultural relevance.60 They were of the view that the current amendment is untenable
because it was done by a secular rationale. Such arguments guarantee postponement of
resolution on any contentious issue, from equal rights in family and property laws, to
Qisas and Diyat worth of a woman, with no assurance that in the ultimate analysis these
will be decided in favour of equal rights.
Jamal suggests we avoid the “re-inscribing [of] a simple framework of
universalism-versus-cultural particularity and instead attempt to understand [Jamaat
women’s] religious agency in their own terms as an unfolding universality…of the
modern”.61 This is consistent with the unwillingness of revivalist scholars to comment on
the political support and silence that Islamist women observe, when violations of
women’s rights take place and if victims are perceived to have transgressed prescribed
modes of acceptable Islamic behaviour. The political record does not support the fact that
Jamaat women prioritise women’s rights inspite of the transgression. Thus, privatisation
of women’s empowerment, modernist or not, is a useful proposition, except it does not
corroborate with the politically articulated record of religious political parties. In fact,
precisely because it is “on their own terms”, the agency of Islamic activist women
contradicts and restricts other women’s empowerment if its expression does not fit the
religiously prescribed mould.
There is also no mention nor supporting evidence in the research by Jamal or
Iqtidar of whether these women challenge structural patriarchy beyond attitudinal
defiance within the religious discourse. While they may personally defy male wishes and
question decisions, their political activism on the contrary, has only demonstrated in the
Pakistani context, a resistance to women’s independent legal or public status thus far.

60

An example of such revivalist scholarship and debate particularly emerging from LUMS can be found at
http://www.baytunur.blogspot.com/
61
Jamal, 2009, above cited, pg. 18.
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The political performances and activism of women of religious parties in Pakistan
in the last decade is contrary to the hope invested in a faith based progress on women’s
rights. If, as revivalists wish, docility and limited mobility in male-dominated religious
outfits qualify as viable acts of women’s rights, then perhaps we can claim that women’s
potential for progress is high in Pakistan. However, it is not possible to measure such
progress without devising a new set of indicators and indices. Meanwhile, according to
any commonsensical 62 indicators, there is no reason for such optimism and hope.
Increased cases of stoning of women, floggings and beheadings, as well as a back-lash in
cities where women are increasingly harassed by vigilante groups of men in the
universities and streets demanding women cover themselves or remain indoors, are not
signs of progress, presumably, by any definition.
So far, stoning and flogging is only known to take place in Taliban territory (with
sporadic incidents spilling over into other areas) and is committed by their militants.
However, the backlash in other parts of the country of harassment and violence to prevent
women from being in public spaces or exercising choice is loosely being termed as
‘Talibanization’. Talibanization is simply the colloquialism that is being used to refer to
the growth of intolerance advocated in the name of religion and which is attempting to
violently prevent women’s mobility and education, as well as targeting shrines or other
perceived ‘unislamic’ practices such as shaving beards or listening to music. This policy
emerges not from the state nor is it just advocated by the Taliban media but in fact, is part
of and supported by the discourse of mainstream religio-political parties, as well as noninstitutional piety movements. They reject the Taliban ethos as extreme and ‘unislamic’
but imbibe and promote many of the same principles packaged in a less extreme or
dramatic version. Such programmes to promote Islamic etiquette are also found in upper
class clubs and theocratic societies and public and private universities. Religious
discourse has subsumed all other forms of theory, philosophy and currency.
Regardless of the nature of leadership, whether it was a liberal General Musharraf
or the earlier despotic Gen. Zia ul Haq, women have served as the ideological identity
markers of the liberal or regressive potential of a regime. In political reality, they
continue to lose the larger struggle for equal rights. Now, a defeatist academic proposal
that attempts to seam together secularism with Islam, as a culturally viable project, relies
on the agency demonstrated by the religio-political parties. This challenges the minimum
expectation that equal rights for women and minorities should be a non-negotiable
determinant of political activism and citizenry. In the process, feminist politics is a price
such a project is willing to sacrifice if it does not fit the cultural, spiritual or political
requirements of an increasingly conservative and anti women agenda of the religiopolitical forces in Pakistan.

62

I refer here to Nivedita Menon’s discussion on the particular and the universal. She problematises the
notion of what she calls ‘the myth of free will’ and calls for the need of a ‘radical politics’ which are “long
term struggles to reclaim meaning at the level of common sense…to challenge local structures of
power…the family and other hegemonising institutions”. She also points out the limitations of the law in
dealing with ‘free will’ and its ‘unfreedom’ though maintains that in democratic politics the notion of free
will should be preserved for the right to proselytise and convert. Nivedita Menon, ‘Recovering Subversion;
Feminist Politics Beyond the Law’, Permanent Black, 2004, India, pg 216.
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